Environmental and Resource Economics

, Volume 31, Issue 1, pp 21–34 | Cite as

Piercing the Veil of Uncertainty in Transboundary Pollution Agreements

  • Charles D. KolstadEmail author


This paper addresses the question of how uncertainty in costs and benefits affects the difficulty of reaching a voluntary agreement among sovereign states. A measure of “difficulty” is constructed related to side-payments necessary to make an agreement a Pareto-improving move. Using a simple model, it is shown that uncertainty actually makes agreement easier.


international environmental agreements pollution side-payments transboundary uncertainty treaties 


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Copyright information

© Springer 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Economics and Bren School of Environmental Science and ManagementUniversity of CaliforniaSanta BarbaraUSA

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