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New cube distinguishers on NFSR-based stream ciphers

  • Abhishek Kesarwani
  • Dibyendu Roy
  • Santanu SarkarEmail author
  • Willi Meier
Article

Abstract

In this paper, we revisit the work of Sarkar et al. (Des Codes Cryptogr 82(1–2):351–375, 2017) and Liu (Advances in cryptology—Crypto 2017, 2017) and show how both of their ideas can be tuned to find good cubes. Here we propose a new algorithm for cube generation which improves existing results on \({\texttt {Zero-Sum}}\) distinguisher. We apply our new cube finding algorithm to three different nonlinear feedback shift register (NFSR) based stream ciphers \({\textsf {Trivium}}\), \(\textsf {Kreyvium}\) and \(\textsf {ACORN}\). From the results, we can see a cube of size 39, which gives \({\texttt {Zero-Sum}}\) for maximum 842 rounds and a significant non-randomness up to 850 rounds of \({\textsf {Trivium}}\). We provide some small size good cubes for \({\textsf {Trivium}}\), which outperform existing ones. We further investigate \(\textsf {Kreyvium}\) and \(\textsf {ACORN}\) by a similar technique and obtain cubes of size 56 and 92 which give \({\texttt {Zero-Sum}}\) distinguisher till 875 and 738 initialization rounds of \(\textsf {Kreyvium}\) and \(\textsf {ACORN}\) respectively. To the best of our knowledge, these results are best results as compared to the existing results on distinguishing attacks of these ciphers. We also provide a table of good cubes of sizes varying from 10 to 40 for these three ciphers.

Keywords

Stream cipher \({\textsf {Trivium}}\) \(\textsf {Kreyvium}\) \(\textsf {ACORN}\) Distinguishing attack 

Mathematics Subject Classification

94A60 

Notes

Acknowledgements

We are very grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their valuable suggestions/comments. We would also like to thank the High Performance Computing Environment (HPCE) at the P. G. Senapathy Center for computing resources, IIT Madras, Chennai for providing Virgo supercluster to carry out the experiments. The first author thanks University Grants Commission (UGC), New Delhi, India for financial support.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Indian Institute of Technology MadrasChennaiIndia
  2. 2.ERTL(E), STQCKolkataIndia
  3. 3.FHNWWindischSwitzerland

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