Designs, Codes and Cryptography

, Volume 74, Issue 2, pp 325–354 | Cite as

On the complexity of the BKW algorithm on LWE

  • Martin R. Albrecht
  • Carlos Cid
  • Jean-Charles Faugère
  • Robert Fitzpatrick
  • Ludovic Perret
Article

Abstract

This work presents a study of the complexity of the Blum–Kalai–Wasserman (BKW) algorithm when applied to the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem, by providing refined estimates for the data and computational effort requirements for solving concrete instances of the LWE problem. We apply this refined analysis to suggested parameters for various LWE-based cryptographic schemes from the literature and compare with alternative approaches based on lattice reduction. As a result, we provide new upper bounds for the concrete hardness of these LWE-based schemes. Rather surprisingly, it appears that BKW algorithm outperforms known estimates for lattice reduction algorithms starting in dimension \(n \approx 250\) when LWE is reduced to SIS. However, this assumes access to an unbounded number of LWE samples.

Keywords

Learning with errors BKW LPN FHE 

Mathematics Subject Classification

94A60 

References

  1. 1.
    Agrawal S., Gentry C., Halevi S., Sahai A.: Discrete Gaussian Leftover Hash Lemma over infinite domains. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2012/714, http://eprint.iacr.org/ (2012). Accessed 27 Dec 2012.
  2. 2.
    Ajtai M., Kumar R., Sivakumar, D.: Sampling short lattice vectors and the closest lattice vector problem. In: IEEE Conference on Computational Complexity, pp. 53–57 (2002).Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Albrecht M.R.: https://bitbucket.org/malb/research-snippets/ (2012). Accessed 30 June 2013.
  4. 4.
    Albrecht M.R., Farshim P., Faugère J-.C., Perret L.: Polly Cracker, revisited. In: Advances in Cryptology—ASIACRYPT 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 7073, pp. 179–196. Springer, Berlin. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2011/289, http://eprint.iacr.org/ (2011). Accessed 19 Nov 2012.
  5. 5.
    Albrecht M., Cid C., Faugère J-.C., Fitzpatrick R., Perret L.: On the complexity of the Arora–Ge algorithm against LWE. In: Faugère J-.C., Gomez D., Gutierrez J., Perret L. (eds.) SCC ’12: Proceedings of the 3nd International Conference on Symbolic Computation and Cryptography, pp. 93–99. Castro-Urdiales, July (2012).Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Albrecht M.R., Fitzpatrick R., Cabracas D., Göpfert F., Schneider M.: A generator for LWE and Ring-LWE instances. http://www.iacr.org/news/files/2013-04-29lwe-generator.pdf (2013). Accessed 29 Apr 2013.
  7. 7.
    Arora S.. Ge R.: New algorithms for learning in presence of errors. In: Aceto L., Henzinger M., Sgall J. (eds.) ICALP. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 6755, pp. 403–415. Springer, Berlin (2011).Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Baigneres T., Junod P., Vaudenay S.: How far can we go beyond linear cryptanalysis? In: Lee P.J. (ed.) Advances in Cryptology—ASIACRYPT 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3329, pp. 432–450, Springer, Berlin (2004).Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Blum A., Kalai A., Wasserman H.: Noise-tolerant learning, the parity problem, and the statistical query model. J. ACM. 50(4), 506–519 (2003).Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Brakerski Z., Vaikuntanathan V.: Efficient fully homomorphic encryption from (standard) LWE. In: Ostrovsky R. (ed.) IEEE 52nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2011, pp. 97–106. IEEE (2011).Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Brakerski Z., Langlois A., Peikert C., Regev O., Stehlé D.: Classical hardness of learning with errors. STOC. (2013) (to appear).Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Chen Y., Nguyen P.Q.: BKZ 2.0: better lattice security estimates. In: Lee D.H., Wang X. (eds.) Advances in Cryptology—ASIACRYPT 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 7073, pp. 1–20, Springer, Berlin (2011).Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Duembgen L.: Bounding standard gaussian tail probabilities. arXiv:1012.2063 (2010).Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Fouque P-.A., Levieil É.: An improved LPN algorithm. In: De Prisco R., Yung M. (eds.) Security and Cryptography for Networks, 5th International Conference, SCN 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4116, pp. 348–359. Springer, Berlin (2006).Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Gama N., Nguyen P.Q., Regev O.: Lattice enumeration using extreme pruning. In: Gilbert H. (ed.) Advances in Cryptology—EUROCRYPT 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 6110, pp. 257–278. Springer, Berlin (2010).Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    Gentry C.: A fully homomorphic encryption scheme. Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University. http://crypto.stanford.edu/craig (2009).
  17. 17.
    Gentry C., Peikert C., Vaikuntanathan V.: Trapdoors for hard lattices and new cryptographic constructions. In: STOC 08: Proceedings of the 40th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 197–206. ACM (2008).Google Scholar
  18. 18.
    Hanrot G., Pujol X., Stehlé, D.: Algorithms for the shortest and closest lattice vector problems. In: Chee Y.M., Guo Z., Ling S., Shao F., Tang Y., Wang H., Xing C. (eds.) IWCC. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 6639, pp. 159–190. Springer, Berlin (2011).Google Scholar
  19. 19.
    Hanrot G., Pujol X., Stehlé D.: Analyzing blockwise lattice algorithms using dynamical systems. In: Rogaway P. (ed.) Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 6841, pp. 447–464. Springer, Berlin (2011).Google Scholar
  20. 20.
    Johansson F. et al.: mpmath: a Python library for arbitrary-precision floating-point arithmetic (version 0.17), February 2011. http://code.google.com/p/mpmath/. Accessed 30 June 2013.
  21. 21.
    Lindner R., Peikert C.: Better key sizes (and attacks) for LWE-based encryption. In: Topics in Cryptology—CT-RSA 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 6558, pp. 319–339, Springer, Berlin (2011).Google Scholar
  22. 22.
    Liu M., Nguyen P.Q.: Solving BDD by enumeration: An update. In: Dawson E. (ed.) CT-RSA. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 7779, pp. 293–309. Springer, Berlin (2013).Google Scholar
  23. 23.
    Lyubashevsky V., Micciancio D., Peikert C., Rosen A.: SWIFFT: A modest proposal for FFT hashing. In: Nyberg K. (ed.) Fast Software Encryption. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 5086, pp. 54–72. Springer, Berlin (2008).Google Scholar
  24. 24.
    Micciancio D., Regev O.: Lattice-based cryptography. In: Bernstein D.J., Buchmann J., Dahmen E. (eds.) Post-Quantum Cryptography, pp. 147–191. Springer, Berlin (2009).Google Scholar
  25. 25.
    Morel I., Stehlé D., Villard G.: H-LLL: using householder inside LLL. In: Johnson J.R., Park H., Kaltofen E. (eds) Symbolic and Algebraic Computation, International Symposium, ISSAC, 2009 pp. 271–278. ACM (2009).Google Scholar
  26. 26.
    Nguyen P.Q.: Lattice reduction algorithms: theory and practice. In: Paterson K.G. (eds.) Advances in Cryptology—EUROCRYPT 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 6632, pp. 2–6. Springer, Berlin (2011).Google Scholar
  27. 27.
    Nguyen P.Q., Stehlé D.: Low-dimensional lattice basis reduction revisited. ACM Trans. Algorithms 5(4) (2009).Google Scholar
  28. 28.
    Pujol X., Stehlé D.: Solving the shortest lattice vector problem in time \(2^{2.465n}\). IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2009:605 (2009).Google Scholar
  29. 29.
    Regev O.: On lattices, learning with errors, random linear codes, and cryptography. J. ACM. 56(6), 84–93 (2009).Google Scholar
  30. 30.
    Regev O.: The learning with errors problem (invited survey). In: IEEE Conference on Computational Complexity, pp. 191–204. IEEE Computer Society (2010).Google Scholar
  31. 31.
    Rückert M., Schneider M.: Estimating the security of lattice-based cryptosystems. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2010, 137 (2010).Google Scholar
  32. 32.
    Stein W.A. et al.: Sage Mathematics Software (Version 5.2). The Sage Development Team, http://www.sagemath.org (2012). Accessed 30 June 2013.

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Martin R. Albrecht
    • 1
  • Carlos Cid
    • 2
  • Jean-Charles Faugère
    • 3
    • 4
    • 5
  • Robert Fitzpatrick
    • 2
  • Ludovic Perret
    • 3
    • 4
    • 5
  1. 1.Technical University of DenmarkLyngbyDenmark
  2. 2.Information Security GroupRoyal Holloway, University of LondonSurreyUK
  3. 3.POLSYS Project, Paris-Rocquencourt CenterINRIAParisFrance
  4. 4.LIP6, UMR 7606UPMC Univ Paris 06ParisFrance
  5. 5.LIP6, UMR 7606CNRSParisFrance

Personalised recommendations