Designs, Codes and Cryptography

, Volume 71, Issue 2, pp 293–313 | Cite as

Lattice-based completely non-malleable public-key encryption in the standard model

Article

Abstract

An encryption scheme is non-malleable if giving an encryption of a message to an adversary does not increase its chances of producing an encryption of a related message (under a given public key). Fischlin introduced a stronger notion, known as complete non-malleability, which requires attackers to have negligible advantage, even if they are allowed to transform the public key under which the related message is encrypted. Ventre and Visconti later proposed a comparison-based definition of this security notion, which is more in line with the well-studied definitions proposed by Bellare et al. The authors also provide additional feasibility results by proposing two constructions of completely non-malleable schemes, one in the common reference string model using non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, and another using interactive encryption schemes. Therefore, the only previously known completely non-malleable (and non-interactive) scheme in the standard model, is quite inefficient as it relies on generic NIZK approach. They left the existence of efficient schemes in the common reference string model as an open problem. Recently, two efficient public-key encryption schemes have been proposed by Libert and Yung, and Barbosa and Farshim, both of them are based on pairing identity-based encryption. At ACISP 2011, Sepahi et al. proposed a method to achieve completely non-malleable encryption in the public-key setting using lattices but there is no security proof for the proposed scheme. In this paper we review the mentioned scheme and provide its security proof in the standard model. Our study shows that Sepahi’s scheme will remain secure even for post-quantum world since there are currently no known quantum algorithms for solving lattice problems that perform significantly better than the best known classical (i.e., non-quantum) algorithms.

Keywords

Public-key encryption Complete non-malleability Lattice Standard model 

Mathematics Subject Classification

94A60 11T71 68P25 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of ComputingMacquarie UniversitySydneyAustralia

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