Crime, Law and Social Change

, Volume 71, Issue 1, pp 107–128 | Cite as

Illicit financial flows within the extractive industries sector: a glance at how legal requirements can be manipulated and diverted

  • Sophie LemaîtreEmail author


The extractive industries sector is considered to be one of the most prone to illicit financial flows. To date, numerous instruments at the national, regional and international level have been adopted targeting the extractive industries sector or specifically combating illicit financial flows but the effectiveness of these instruments remains uncertain as highlighted with the recent scandals that tarnished this sector. In fact some stakeholders, in particular extractive companies and government officials, are being creative and innovative in order to play with legislations combating these illicit practices and perpetuate illicit financial flows. Playing with the rules of the game is made possible not only through the support of intermediaries but also the availability of legal tools. This article provides a glance at how these actors use the law to abuse and manipulate legal frameworks.


Extractive industries Corruption Transparency Abuse of law Illicit financial flows 


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institut de l’Ouest : Droit et Europe (UMR CNRS 6262)University of Rennes 1RennesFrance

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