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Crime, Law and Social Change

, Volume 66, Issue 2, pp 147–163 | Cite as

Corruption control

Article

Abstract

How can we explain why countries that apply similar remedies against corruption vary so much in their actual incidence of corruption? While high penalties for business crime may prevent corruption in some situations, it may exacerbate the problem in others. We find enforcement of laws against corruption to depend on the form of cooperation between layers of law enforcement authority in the state administration. Small local differences in honesty and cooperation may lead to large differences in effective law enforcement and in actual levels of corruption.

Keywords

Criminal Justice System Illegal Activity Economic Crime Corrupt Deal Corruption Control 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of OsloOsloNorway
  2. 2.Department of Accounting, Auditing and LawNorwegian School of EconomicsBergenNorway

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