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Why voters do not throw the rascals out?— A conceptual framework for analysing electoral punishment of corruption

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Abstract

One of the intriguing phenomena in democracy is the fact that politicians involved in, accused of or condemned for corruption in a court of law get re-elected by their constituents. In some cases, corruption does not seem to negatively affect the development of political careers. In this introductory article, we try to develop a multidimensional framework for analysing electoral punishment of corruption. First, we will look into various studies on electoral punishment and highlight their advancements and shortcomings. Then, we will propose a more dynamic account of electoral punishment of corruption that takes into account individual as well as macro level explanations. Finally, we will disaggregate these two analytical dimensions into various explanatory factors.

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Notes

  1. The expression was informally used for the first time, over 50 years ago, during the campaign of the Mayor and Governor of the City and State of São Paulo (Brazil), Adhemar de Barros.

  2. Kostadinova [65, 66] also claims that high levels of corruption reduce political participation.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. ICS-UL, Lisbon, Portugal

    Luís de Sousa

  2. CIES-ISCTE/IUL, Lisbon, Portugal

    Marcelo Moriconi

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  1. Luís de Sousa
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  2. Marcelo Moriconi
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Correspondence to Luís de Sousa.

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de Sousa, L., Moriconi, M. Why voters do not throw the rascals out?— A conceptual framework for analysing electoral punishment of corruption. Crime Law Soc Change 60, 471–502 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-013-9483-5

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