Crime, Law and Social Change

, Volume 49, Issue 1, pp 61–79 | Cite as

Cadre recruitment and corruption: what goes wrong?



Why do so many corrupt officials rise up in the Chinese official hierarchy in the first place? This paper addresses this question by looking at corruption in the cadre recruitment system as a source of the problem. It attempts to show that despite meaningful reforms to improve cadre recruitment, especially through greater input and supervision from below, these reforms have not succeeded in fundamentally reshaping cadre incentives in the direction of accountability towards the below. Rather, the reforms have in many ways exacerbated incentives for opportunism and maneuvering on the part of individual officials. In explaining the new problems and failures in personnel matters, the paper places blame on incentive and structural distortions in the recruitment while also taking into consideration the realities of China’s vast local variance that combine to affect enforcement and incentives for compliance.


Cadre Incentive Standing Committee Party Committee Corrupt Official Party Secretary 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Political Science, Queens and the Graduate CenterCity Univerity of New YorkFlushingUSA

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