Crime, Law and Social Change

, Volume 49, Issue 1, pp 45–59 | Cite as

Institutionalized corruption: power overconcentration of the First-in-Command in China

  • Ren Jianming
  • Du Zhizhou


Among various kinds of corruption in China, corruption of the First-in-Command (FIC) is most pernicious, threatening the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and the stability of the state. This paper examines several specific institutional arrangements under China’s current political structure, including the people’s congress, the ruling party system, and the collective leadership team system, to see how they have contributed to power overconcentration in the hands of FICs. This is done in a two-round process: first through the collective leadership team and then by the gestating decision-making rule. The paper also assesses four institutional innovations designed to prevent FIC corruption.


Official Position Party Organization Party Committee Party Secretary Party Constitution 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


  1. 1.
    The Central Committee of CCP (2003). Supervision regulations within CCP.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    The Central Committee of CCP (2004, September). Resolution of Central Committee of CCP on Strengthening the Ruling Capability Construction of the Party. (Document announced at the 4th Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Beijing).Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. Adopted at the Fifth Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress in 1982 and amended in 1988, 1993, 1999 and 2004.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    The Constitution of Communist Party of China. Adopted at 16th National Congress of Communist Party of China, Nov 2002.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    de Secondat Montesquieu, C. L. (1963). The spirit of law [Chinese version]. Shanghai: The Commercial Press.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Xiaoping, D. (1989). Urgent Tasks of China’s Third Generation of Collective Leadership. Anthology of Deng Xiaoping, 3, 313.Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Zengke, H. (2001). To impel administrative innovation and perfect the arrangements against corruption. Marxism and Reality, 5, 56.Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Zemin, J. (2006). Speech on the third plenary session of the Central Discipline Inspection. Anthology of Jiang Zemin, 1, 319.Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Zemin, J. (2002). Report on 16th National Congress of Communist Party of China. 8 Dec 2002.Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    North, D. (1994). The structure and evolution in economic history. Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press.Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    North, D. (1995). The new institutional economics and third world development. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Jianming, R., & Guan, W. (2006). On the causes for cadre appointment corruption. Academic World, 5, 19–26.Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Chuanliang, S. (2001). Reasons for inefficiency of supervision over FIC and countermeasures. Journal of Yunnan Administration College, 5, 67.Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Yang, S., & Chunhua, X. (2002). Jiao Jiang: 13 years of reform and practice on the vote-deciding rule adopted in cadre appointment. Journal of Anti-corruption, 1, 22–25.Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Zaifu, S. (2004). Openness and transparency-a permanent cure for corruption. Qiushi, 4, 28.Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    Fengying, T. (2003). To intensify supervision is a permanent cure for corruption. Theory Research, 5, 25.Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    Transparency International (2000). Confronting corruption: The elements of a national integrity system. TI Source Book 2000. Retrieved April 13, 2007, from TI Website:
  18. 18.
    Ying, Y. (2002). On ethics of political institution-to begin with corruption. Journal of Philosophy, 10, 6.Google Scholar
  19. 19.
    Xu, Z. (2004). Major reasons for the inefficiency of supervision over FIC and its solution. Journal of Yunnan Administration College, 3, 87.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Anti-corruption and Governance Research Centre School of Public Policy and ManagementTsinghua UniversityBeijingChina
  2. 2.School of Public Policy and ManagementTsinghua UniversityBeijingChina

Personalised recommendations