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Constitutional Political Economy

, Volume 30, Issue 4, pp 438–466 | Cite as

Determinants of governmental support of Russian companies: lessons on industrial policy, rent-seeking and corruption

  • Dennis CoatesEmail author
  • Iuliia Naidenova
  • Petr Parshakov
Original Paper
  • 54 Downloads

Abstract

The Russian government has programs to assist Russian companies with financial and organizational support. Award of procurement contracts may also serve as assistance to companies. This paper uses data from a survey of Russian companies to draw inferences about the motivation behind the choice of recipients. Possible motivations are an intent to foster economic development, successful rent-seeking by recipients or simply corruption. The evidence is mixed. There is support for both the economic development motive and rent-seeking in the analysis of financial and organizational support. A role for corruption is most evident in the procurement contract results.

Keywords

Government support Procurement Industrial policy Bribery Public choice 

JEL Classification

D73 H00 H57 L38 O25 

Notes

Acknowledgements

This study comprises research findings from the Project No. 18-18-00270 supported by the Russian Science Foundation.

Compliance with ethical standards

Conflict of interest

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Maryland Baltimore CountyBaltimoreUSA
  2. 2.National Research University Higher School of EconomicsPermRussia

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