Constitutional Political Economy

, Volume 30, Issue 4, pp 467–479 | Cite as

The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice: a masterful compendium

  • Richard E. WagnerEmail author
Book Review


This is a review article of The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, edited by Roger Congleton, Bernard Grofman, and Stefan Voigt. This two-volume collection has 90 chapters, with each chapter averaging 20.4 pages (excluding the volumes’ indexes). My subtitle conveys my judgment of this work. The articles are written for serious readers, and they give clear and concise statements of the material they cover. Someone who reads one of the articles will arrive in the vicinity of the frontier of the mainstream of public choice theorizing as this has developed since the middle of the twentieth century. Despite my position from somewhere outside the public choice mainstream, I acknowledge readily and enthusiastically the ability of the essays in this Handbook to convey the contemporary state of public choice theorizing. The editors and authors deserve congratulations for their fine work.


Public choice Constitutional political economy Voting Elections Interest groups Rent seeking Political parties Dictatorship 

JEL Classification

A12 A33 D70 H40 P50 



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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsGeorge Mason UniversityFairfaxUSA

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