Constitutional Political Economy

, Volume 27, Issue 1, pp 1–40 | Cite as

State provision of constitutional goods

Original Paper


This paper investigates the impact of constitutional rights on the level of public expenditure in a large sample of countries. To do so, we construct a panel of 73 countries from 1960 to 2011. We first investigate factors that drive constitutional changes regarding constitutional rights. To address potential endogeneity concerns in the choice of constitutional rules, we rely on an instrumental variable within estimation (country and time fixed effects) to estimate the impact of constitutional rights on government size. We find that larger governments tend to inscribe fewer rights in their constitutions, but we do not detect any impact of constitutional rights on the government size.


Constitutional rights Constitutional economics Government expenditure Government size Endogenous constitutions 


E60 H50 K10 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.CRED (TEPP)Université Paris II Panthéon-AssasParisFrance

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