Constitutional Political Economy

, Volume 23, Issue 1, pp 22–44

Agenda control in an unstable multiparty parliamentary democracy: evidence from the Israeli public sector

Original Paper

DOI: 10.1007/s10602-011-9113-0

Cite this article as:
Rosenthal, M. Const Polit Econ (2012) 23: 22. doi:10.1007/s10602-011-9113-0

Abstract

As elected politicians’ knowledge, information and expertise about the policy process decrease, so will their ability to control it and to independently shape its agenda. When elected politicians spend less time in their positions due to cabinet instability, they will have less knowledge about policy issues in comparison to career bureaucrats. Multiparty parliamentary systems are characterized by cabinet instability, hence increasing the likelihood of this phenomenon. Indeed it has been shown that in these systems the bureaucracy is the main player in the policy process. This paper illustrates this phenomenon in the Israeli context, a clear example of a multiparty democracy with an unstable cabinet and a dominant bureaucracy.

Keywords

Multiparty parliaments Agenda control Cabinet instability Agency problem Israeli public sector 

JEL Classification

H800 H830 L380 J580 

Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and StrategyThe Interdisciplinary Center (IDC)HerzliyaIsrael

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