A Simplified Model of Tax Collection from Enterprises in the Presence of Legal and Shadow Capital
In this article we develop and analyze a simplified mathematical model of financial interaction between the state and the enterprise on tax issues. In the first part, we apply heuristic considerations to construct a simplified model that describes the dynamics of tax collection from an enterprise whose capital consists of both legal and shadow components. In the secont part we investigate this model in a game-theoretical framework.
KeywordsOptimal Length Shadow Zone Stackelberg Equilibrium Legal Capital Enterprise Strategy
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