Self-regulation through social institutions: A framework for the design of open agent-based electronic marketplaces
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Abstract
In this paper, we argue that allowing self-interested agents to activate social institutions during runtime can improve the robustness (i.e., stability, reliability, or scalability) of open multiagent systems (MAS). Referring to sociological theory, we consider institutions to be rules that need to be activated and adopted by the agent population during runtime and propose a framework for self-regulation of MAS for the domain of electronic marketplaces. The framework consists of three different institutional types that are defined by the mechanisms and instances that generate, change or safeguard them. We suggest that allowing autonomous agents both the reasoning about their compliance with a rule and the selection of an adequate institutional types helps to balance the trade-off between the autonomy of self-interested agents and the maintenance of social order (cf. Castelfranchi, 2000) in MAS, and to ensure almost the same qualities as in closed environments. A preliminary report of the evaluation of the prototype by empirical simulations is given.
Keywords
Institutions Self-regulation BDI Electronic market Multiagent systemsPreview
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