Cluster Computing

, Volume 22, Supplement 2, pp 4075–4084 | Cite as

Repeated game analysis of power suppliers based on dynamic coopetition process and slightly altruistic factor

  • Jiang Lanxiang
  • Wang HongleiEmail author
  • Hu Zhijun
  • Zhao Wei


In this paper, based on repeated game theory, the dynamic coopetition game model between power supply enterprises is established to analyze the long-term equilibrium from a more practical point of view. The slightly altruistic factor is used as a measurement of system cooperation degree, and the influence of the variation between slightly altruistic factor and discount rate is considered in the long-term dynamic equilibrium. The results show that only part of coopetition can find the feasible discount rate to maintain long-term equilibrium. The discount rate required by the identical altruistic relationship is relatively low and stable. The degree of altruistic difference between the two sides of the game decides the existence of the discount rate required for maintaining long-term dynamic equilibrium. This paper makes important generalization for the pre-existing equilibrium analysis method of power market and the general repeated game method, and has certain theoretical value and practical significance.


Power market Slightly altruistic factor Coopetition equilibrium Repeated game 



Joint funding project of GuiZhou University (QKHLH 20167424 and QKHLH 20167425); Guizhou Science and Technology Hall’s project (QKHGY20113022); National Natural Science Foundation of China (71361003 and 11761023).


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jiang Lanxiang
    • 1
    • 2
  • Wang Honglei
    • 1
    Email author
  • Hu Zhijun
    • 2
  • Zhao Wei
    • 2
  1. 1.College of ManagementGuiZhou UniveristyGuiYangChina
  2. 2.College of Mathematics and StatisticsGuiZhou UniveristyGuiYangChina

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