Cluster Computing

, Volume 21, Issue 1, pp 287–297 | Cite as

A new efficient authorized private set intersection protocol from Schnorr signature and its applications

  • Yamin Wen
  • Zheng GongEmail author
  • Zhengan Huang
  • Weidong Qiu


Private set intersection (PSI) has been proposed to achieve sharing sensitive information with privacy, which allows two participators to compute the intersection of their private sets without revealing any other information. Authorized private set intersection (APSI) is a variant of PSI such that APSI requires client sets for intersection must be authorized. Although many schemes have been proposed for linear optimization in the existing APSI publications, how to linearly optimize the APSI protocol based on the Schnorr signature has not been proposed yet. In this paper, we propose a new efficient APSI protocol with linear complexity (denoted by LC-APSI) from the Schnorr signature. LC-APSI is proven secure in the random oracle model by assuming the intractability of the gap Diffie–Hellman problem. Apart from the existed efficient APSI protocols based on RSA and IBE, the new proposal fills up the technical extensions and applications of APSI. In particular, our proposal on sharing sensitive information is also instantiated which can be used to the practical applications in cloud computing or outsourced data sharing.


Information sharing Authorized private set intersection Linear complexity Cloud services 



This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 61572028, 61472091, 61300204), the Project of Science and Technology of Guangdong (Nos. 2016B010125002, 2015A030313630, S2013020011913, 2014A030313439), Natural Science Foundation of Guangdong Province for Distinguished Young Scholars (2014A030306020), Guangzhou Scholars Project for Universities of Guangzhou (No. 1201561613), Science and Technology Planning Project of Guangdong province (2015B010129015), the Ministry of education of Humanities and Social Science Project (No. 15YJCZH029), the Social Science Planning Project of Guangzhou City (No. 2016gzyb25) and the Opening Project of Shanghai Key Laboratory of Integrated Administration Technologies for Information Security.


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© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Statistics and MathematicsGuangdong University of Finance and EconomicsGuangzhouChina
  2. 2.School of Computer ScienceSouth China Normal UniversityGuangzhouChina
  3. 3.School of Computer ScienceGuangzhou UniversityGuangzhouChina
  4. 4.School of Cyber SecurityShanghai Jiaotong UniversityShanghaiChina

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