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Climatic Change

, Volume 144, Issue 1, pp 15–27 | Cite as

Governing global problems under uncertainty: making bottom-up climate policy work

  • Charles F. Sabel
  • David G. Victor
Article

Abstract

With the failure of integrated, top-down bargaining strategies, analysts and diplomats have now turned to bottom-up methods such as “building blocks” and “climate clubs” to coordinate national climate change policies and to avoid persistent diplomatic deadlock. We agree that decomposition of the grand problem of climate change into smaller units is a crucial first step towards effective cooperation. But we argue that given the great uncertainty of the feasibility and costs of potential solutions, this bottom-up approach will only work if it is supported by institutions that promote joint exploration of possibilities by public and private actors along with the scaling up of successes. As politics precludes creating many of these institutions under the consensus-oriented decision rules of the UN system, engaged outsiders—including especially clubs or building blocks that can learn in the face of uncertainty—working in parallel with the UN diplomatic process will have to provide them.

Keywords

Montreal Protocol Veto Player Total Maximum Daily Load Global Public Good Trade Measure 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

We thank Bob Keohane, Nat Keohane, Scott Barrett, Michael Oppenheimer, Dick Stewart, Tana Johnson, Johannes Urpelainen, Bryce Rudyk, Jim Bacchus, Steve Charnovitz, Alan Alexandroff, Joanne Scott, Detlef Sprinz, Dustin Tingley, Rory ODonnell and Jonathan Zeitlin for comments on a draft. Bob, Grainne de Burca, and Rick Locke organized an exceptionally helpful seminar at the Watson Institute of Brown University on experimentalist governance in November 2014 out of which this paper emerged and thanks to participants at a Princeton University seminar in June 2015. Special thanks to Linda Wong and Jackson Salovaara for extraordinary research assistance. Thanks also to Jen Smyser and Todd Edwards for related conversations. Chuck Sabel and David Victor acknowledge support from the Stanley Foundation. David Victor is also supported by UC San Diego, Electric Power Research Institute, and the Norwegian Research Foundation.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Columbia Law SchoolColumbia UniversityNew YorkUSA
  2. 2.School of Global Policy and StrategyUniversity of California at San DiegoSan DiegoUSA
  3. 3.Global Agenda Council on Governance for Sustainability, World Economic ForumGenevaSwitzerland

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