Probabilities in climate policy advice: a critical comment
- First Online:
- 206 Downloads
This essay explores as to whether probabilistic climate forecasting is consistent with the prerequisites of democratic scientific policy advice. It argues that, given the boundaries of our current knowledge, it is highly problematic to assign exact, unconditional probabilities to possible values of climate sensitivity. The range of possible–instead of probable–future climate scenarios is what climate policy should be based on.
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- Albert M (2003) Bayesian rationality and decision making: a critical review. Anal Krit 25:101–117Google Scholar
- Cartwright N (1999) The dappled world: a study of the boundaries of science. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
- Dessai S, Hulme M (2003) Does climate policy need probabilities? Working Paper 34, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change ResearchGoogle Scholar
- Gillies D (2000) Philosophical theories of probability. Routledge, LondonGoogle Scholar
- Levi I (1980) The enterprise of knowledge. An assay on knowledge, credal probability and chance. MIT Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
- Stainforth DA, Aina T, Christensen C, Collins M, Faull N, Frame DJ, Kettleborough JA, Knight S, Martin A, Murphy JM, Piani C, Sexton D, Smith LA, Spicer RA, Thorpe AJ, Allen MR (2005) Uncertainty in predictions of the climate response to rising levels of greenhouse gases. Nature 433:403–406 (January)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Walley P (1991) Statistical reasoning with imprecise probabilities. Chapman and Hall, New YorkGoogle Scholar