Whale Watching on the Trading Floor: Unravelling Collusive Rogue Trading in Banks

  • Hagen RafeldEmail author
  • Sebastian G. Fritz-Morgenthal
  • Peter N. Posch
Original Paper


Recent history reveals a series of rogue traders, jeopardizing their employers’ assets and reputation. There have been instances of unauthorized acting in concert between traders, their supervisors and/or firms’ decision makers and executives, resulting in collusive rogue trading. We explore organizational misbehaviour theory and explain three major collusive rogue trading events at National Australia Bank, JPMorgan with its London Whale and the interest reference rate manipulation/LIBOR scandal through a descriptive model of organizational/structural, individual and group forces. Our model draws conclusions on how banks can set up behavioural risk management and internal control frameworks to mitigate potential collusive rogue trading.


Behavioural risk Collusion Corporate culture Misconduct Organizational misbehaviour theory Rogue trading 

JEL Classification

K42 M14 P37 



We would like to thank the anonymous referees for their valuable comments.


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© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centre of Finance, Risk & Resource ManagementTU Dortmund UniversityDortmundGermany
  2. 2.Frankfurt Institute for Risk Management and Regulation (FIRM)FrankfurtGermany
  3. 3.Bain & Company Inc.FrankfurtGermany

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