Vortex of Corruption: Longitudinal Analysis of Normative Pressures in Top Global Companies
It is widely acknowledged that corruption by any firm is problematic. More importantly, its negative effects are compounded when (a) corruption is present in large firms with global reach and (b) corruption ceases to be a single instance but becomes a reoccurring or perpetuating phenomenon over time. Though the magnification of corruption over both time and size of operations creates scale effects that amplify its detrimental consequences, this context remains largely unexamined empirically. Thus, our research question is: What are the factors that contribute to corruption by large global firms? Drawing on institutional theory, we examine the normative pressures that interact to create a vortex of corporate corruption that persisted over several years. We analyze a 9-year longitudinal dataset of 469 unique FT Global 500 companies representing 31 primary industries and 33 countries with over 3700 company year observations. Results help disentangle a complex interaction of firm-level and headquarters country-level factors that drive corruption and impact performance among top global firms.
KeywordsOrganizational corruption Institutions Normative pressures Longitudinal Interaction
Compliance with Ethical Standards
Conflict of interest
Leyla Orudzheva declares that she has no conflict of interest. Manjula Salimath declares that she has no conflict of interest. Robert Pavur declares that he has no conflict of interest.
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