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Vortex of Corruption: Longitudinal Analysis of Normative Pressures in Top Global Companies

  • Leyla Orudzheva
  • Manjula S. SalimathEmail author
  • Robert Pavur
Original Paper

Abstract

It is widely acknowledged that corruption by any firm is problematic. More importantly, its negative effects are compounded when (a) corruption is present in large firms with global reach and (b) corruption ceases to be a single instance but becomes a reoccurring or perpetuating phenomenon over time. Though the magnification of corruption over both time and size of operations creates scale effects that amplify its detrimental consequences, this context remains largely unexamined empirically. Thus, our research question is: What are the factors that contribute to corruption by large global firms? Drawing on institutional theory, we examine the normative pressures that interact to create a vortex of corporate corruption that persisted over several years. We analyze a 9-year longitudinal dataset of 469 unique FT Global 500 companies representing 31 primary industries and 33 countries with over 3700 company year observations. Results help disentangle a complex interaction of firm-level and headquarters country-level factors that drive corruption and impact performance among top global firms.

Keywords

Organizational corruption Institutions Normative pressures Longitudinal Interaction 

Notes

Compliance with Ethical Standards

Conflict of interest

Leyla Orudzheva declares that she has no conflict of interest. Manjula Salimath declares that she has no conflict of interest. Robert Pavur declares that he has no conflict of interest.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Leyla Orudzheva
    • 1
  • Manjula S. Salimath
    • 2
    Email author
  • Robert Pavur
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of Management and Marketing, College of Business AdministrationTexas A&M University-Central TexasKilleenUSA
  2. 2.Department of Management, College of BusinessUniversity of North TexasDentonUSA
  3. 3.Department of Information Technology and Decision Sciences, College of BusinessUniversity of North TexasDentonUSA

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