Circumvention of Trade Defence Measures and Business Ethics

  • Antonella Forganni
  • Heidi Reed
Review Paper


With the rise of globalization, the debate around free trade versus fair trade and liberalism versus protectionism has become increasingly complicated. At times, the regulations of the World Trade Organization seem to pit developed markets against emerging markets as governments attempt to expand international trade while at the same time protecting local industry. To this end, antidumping measures have been extensively developed as a way to block foreign low-cost goods (often produced in emerging countries) from entering domestic markets. In response, some exporters have begun to circumvent these antidumping measures using strategies such as transhipment, assembly operations, and slightly modified products. While previous studies have addressed the ethical aspects of antidumping measures, this study will focus on the ethics of circumvention strategies with a special focus on the theories on legal compliance and, specifically, civil disobedience and conscientious evasion.


Antidumping World Trade Organization Business ethics Circumvention Civil disobedience Conscientious evasion Legal compliance Trade defence instruments 



Advisory Centre on WTO Law


Association of Southeast Asian Nations


Corporate Social Responsibility


Dispute Settlement Body


Dispute Settlement Understanding


European Union


General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade


World Trade Organisation



The authors would like to thank Dr. Alain Anquetil, Professor of Ethics at ESSCA, for his insightful feedback on their work and Alliance Europa.

Compliance with Ethical Standards

Conflict of interest

Authors Antonella Forganni and Heidi Reed declare that there is no conflict of interest.

Ethical Approval

This article does not contain any studies with human participants or animals performed by any of the authors.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.ESSCA AngersAngersFrance
  2. 2.The Hong Kong PolytechnicHong KongHong Kong

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