Journal of Business Ethics

, Volume 154, Issue 2, pp 285–300 | Cite as

MBA CEOs, Short-Term Management and Performance

  • Danny MillerEmail author
  • Xiaowei Xu
Original Paper


There is ample discussion of MBA self-serving values in the corporate social responsibility literature, and yet empirical studies regarding the corporate manifestations and consequences of those values are scant. In a comprehensive study of major US public corporations, we find that MBA CEOs are more apt than their non-MBA counterparts to engage in short-term strategic expedients such as positive earnings management and suppression of R&D, which in turn are followed by compromised firm market valuations.


MBA CEOs Firm performance Self-serving behavior Short-term management Strategy 


Compliance with Ethical Standards

Conflict of interest

The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

Ethical Approval

This article does not contain any studies with human participants performed by any of the authors.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.HEC MontrealMontrealCanada
  2. 2.University of AlbertaEdmontonCanada
  3. 3.University of Rhode IslandKingstonUSA

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