Journal of Business Ethics

, Volume 96, Issue 3, pp 467–478 | Cite as

Corporate Lobbying in Antidumping Cases: Looking into the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act

Article
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Abstract

Is protection for sale? In this research, we examine the effect of corporate lobbying on the disbursement of proceeds of the recent antidumping petitions under the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act, the so-called Byrd amendment. With the use of novel U.S. Customs Service data on the disbursements of the antidumping duties to the injured firms, we find that the petitioning firms that spend more on lobbying gain larger proceeds. We conclude that firms that lobby are the ones that get protection, not necessarily the healthy ones.

Key words

antidumping lobbying protection Byrd amendment 
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Notes

Acknowledgments

The authors thank Mike Peng, Mona Makhija and Bernard Yeung for valuable comments on the earlier version of this paper. We also would like to acknowledge able assistance of Mine Ozer and Ping Wu in data collection. The second author is particularly grateful for the support of KAIST Coporate Social Responsibility Center, Columbia Social Enterprise Center, and ARK Private Fund/Investment Advisors Inc.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of ManagementUniversity of Texas at DallasRichardsonU.S.A.
  2. 2.Graduate School of ManagementKorea Advanced Institute of Science and TechnologySeoulKorea

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