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Journal of Business Ethics

, Volume 89, Supplement 4, pp 403–416 | Cite as

The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: An Innovation in Global Governance and Conflict Prevention

  • Virginia Haufler
Article

Abstract

The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme is an innovation in global governance that combines a voluntary industry-led certification system with an inter-state import/export control regime. States, industry, and activists speedily negotiated it in large part due to the concentrated structure of the industry, and the complementary nature of emerging norms regarding both corporate behavior and international intervention in civil conflicts. The potential strength of the Kimberley Process lies in its state-led border controls, but these are being undermined by weak national governments. This effort may not provide an effective model for regulating other “conflict commodities” because of the unique character of the diamond market.

Key words

certification diamonds governance Kimberley Process norms transnational activism 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of MarylandCollege ParkU.S.A.

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