Journal of Business Ethics

, Volume 83, Issue 4, pp 789–804 | Cite as

An Experimental Investigation of Emotions and Reasoning in the Trolley Problem

  • Alessandro Lanteri
  • Chiara Chelini
  • Salvatore Rizzello


Elaborating on the notions that humans possess different modalities of decision-making and that these are often influenced by moral considerations, we conducted an experimental investigation of the Trolley Problem. We presented the participants with two standard scenarios (‹lever’ and ‹stranger’) either in the usual or in reversed order. We observe that responses to the lever scenario, which result from (moral) reasoning, are affected by our manipulation; whereas responses to the stranger scenario, triggered by moral emotions, are unaffected. Furthermore, when asked to express general moral opinions on the themes of the Trolley Problem, about half of the participants reveal some inconsistency with the responses they had previously given.


experiments intuition moral emotions moral judgement moral reasoning trolley problem 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alessandro Lanteri
    • 1
    • 2
  • Chiara Chelini
    • 3
  • Salvatore Rizzello
    • 4
  1. 1.Department of Economic Science and Quantitative Methods (SEMeQ), Faculty of EconomicsUniversity of Eastern Piedmont at NovaraNovaraItaly
  2. 2.Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and Economics (EIPE), Faculty of PhilosophyErasmus Universiteit RotterdamRotterdamThe Netherlands
  3. 3.Department of EconomicsTurin UniversityTorinoItaly
  4. 4.Department of Legal and Economic ScienceFaculty of Law, University of Eastern Piedmont at AlessandriaAlessandriaItaly

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