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Journal of Business Ethics

, Volume 80, Issue 1, pp 23–35 | Cite as

Ethics and Lobbying: The Case of Real Estate Brokerage

  • David BarkerEmail author
Article

Abstract

Members of licensed occupations benefit from legal standards that limit entry into their professions. Is it ethical for these professionals to give political support to these standards? I examined the case of real estate brokers and found that their educational requirements raise average commissions by one quarter of a percentage point, costing consumers $5.4 billion per year without improving the quality of brokerage services. The case raises interesting ethical issues which are difficult to resolve.

Keywords

brokerage ethics real estate regulation 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of IowaIowa CityU.S.A.
  2. 2.Iowa CityU.S.A.

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