Biology & Philosophy

, Volume 28, Issue 4, pp 559–576 | Cite as

A stag hunt with signalling and mutual beliefs

Article
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Abstract

The problem of cooperation for rational actors comprises two sub problems: the problem of the intentional object (under what description does each actor perceive the situation?) and the problem of common knowledge for finite minds (how much belief iteration is required?). I will argue that subdoxastic signalling can solve the problem of the intentional object as long as this is confined to a simple coordination problem. In a more complex environment like an assurance game signals may become unreliable. Mutual beliefs can then bolster the earlier attained equilibrium. I will first address these two problems by means of an example, in order to draw some more general lessons about combining evolutionary theory and rationality later on.

Keywords

Stag hunt game Evolutionary game theory Game theory Common knowledge Convention 
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Notes

Acknowledgments

Many thanks to Govert den Hartogh and Gijs van Donselaar.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentUniversity of AmsterdamAmsterdamThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Philosophy DepartmentDelft University of TechnologyDelftThe Netherlands

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