Advertisement

Axiomathes

pp 1–15 | Cite as

Safety, the Preface Paradox and Possible Worlds Semantics

  • Michael J. ShafferEmail author
Original Paper
  • 23 Downloads

Abstract

This paper contains an argument to the effect that possible worlds semantics renders semantic knowledge impossible, no matter what ontological interpretation is given to possible worlds. The essential contention made is that possible worlds semantic knowledge is unsafe and this is shown by a parallel with the preface paradox.

Keywords

Preface paradox Semantic knowledge Safety Knowledge Semantics Possible worlds 

References

  1. Adams R (1974) Theories of actuality. Noûs 8:211–231CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Barwise J, Perry J (1983) Situations and attitudes. MIT Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  3. Carnap R (1947) Meaning and necessity. University of Chicago Press, ChicagoGoogle Scholar
  4. Copeland J (2002) The genesis of possible worlds semantics. J Philos Log 31:99–137CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Cresswell M (1978) Semantic competence. In: Guenthner F, Guenthner-Reutter M (eds) Meaning and translation. Duckworth, London, pp 9–43Google Scholar
  6. Cresswell M (1988) Semantical essays. Kluwer, DordrechtCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Forrester P (1986) Ways worlds could be. Aust J Philos 64:15–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Hintikka J (1969) Models for modalities: selected essays. D. Reidel, DordrechtGoogle Scholar
  9. Hintikka J (1983) Situations, possible worlds and attitudes. Synthese 54:153–162CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Kripke S (2011) Nozik on knowledge. In: Kripke S (ed) Collected papers, vol 1. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 162–224Google Scholar
  11. Lewis CI (1947) An analysis of knowledge and valuation. Open Court Publishing, La SalleGoogle Scholar
  12. Lewis D (1970) General semantics. Synthese 22:18–67CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Lewis D (1986) On the plurality of worlds. Blackwell, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  14. Makinson D (1965) The paradox of the preface. Analysis 25:205–207CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Melia J (2003) Modality. Queens-McGill University Press, MontrealGoogle Scholar
  16. Montague R (1974) Formal philosophy. Yale University Press, New HavenGoogle Scholar
  17. Olin D (2003) Paradox. Queens-McGill University Press, MontrealGoogle Scholar
  18. Popper K (1959) The logic of scientific discovery. Harper & Row, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  19. Pritchard D (2007) Anti-luck epistemology. Synthese 158:277–298CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Pritchard D (2008) Knowledge, luck, and lotteries. In: Hendricks V, Pritchard D (eds) New waves in epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan, London, pp 28–51Google Scholar
  21. Pritchard D (2009a) Safety-based epistemology: whither now? J Philos Res 34:33–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Pritchard D (2009b) Knowledge. Palgrave Macmillan, LondonGoogle Scholar
  23. Shaffer M (2017) An argument for the safety condition. Logos Episteme 8:517–520CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Shaffer M (2018) Safety and the preface paradox. Log Episteme 9:215–219CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Shaffer M, Morris J (2006) A paradox for possible worlds semantics. Log et Anal 49:307–317Google Scholar
  26. Shaffer M, Morris J (2010) The epistemic inadequacy of ersatzer possible world semantics. Loge et Anal 53:61–76Google Scholar
  27. Sosa E (1999) How to defeat opposition to Moore. Philos Perspect 13:141–154Google Scholar
  28. Stalnaker R (1976) Possible worlds. Noûs 10:65–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. Stalnaker R (1986) Possible worlds and situations. J Philos Log 15:109–123CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Stalnaker R (2011) Mere possibilities. Princeton University Press, PrincetonGoogle Scholar
  31. Williamson T (2000) Knowledge and its limits. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  32. Wittgenstein L (1922/1961) Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Routledge, LondonGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy, CH 365St. Cloud State UniversitySt. CloudUSA

Personalised recommendations