, Volume 28, Issue 6, pp 619–637 | Cite as

Higher-Level Perspectives and Ethics of Technoscience

Scheme Dynamics for an Action-, Technology-Shaped and Responsibility-Oriented Philosophy of Science
  • Hans LenkEmail author
Original Paper


New accents in the philosophy of technology and philosophy of science amounting, e.g., to the so-called schools of the “New Experimentalism”, “New Instrumentalism” and, recently, “New Mechanism” emphasize the impact of instruments, experiments, and “mechanisms” of the respective technologies opened up by the progress of ever-improving measuring instruments, procedures etc. In addition, it would be necessary to accentuate the process- and action-orientation including practical responsibility problems and dynamic systems models from an epistemological perspective of the methodological scheme-interpretationist approach developed by the author since the seventies of last century. The necessity of multi-disciplinary mutual influences was already time and again stressed regarding philosophy of science. But relatively new is not only the methodological turn involved but also the necessity to go to higher levels of abstraction, metatheories, action- and value-orientation. Therefore, we have to go more interdisciplinary, systems-oriented, and higher-level. That implies notable consequences for an ethics, or rather, meta-ethics for philosophy of science. Practice-oriented philosophers of (techno-)science will have to go more methodological, multidisciplinary and even (meta-)responsible.


Scheme-interpretations Technoscience Multidisciplinarity Meta-levels Kinds of responsibilities Distribution of responsibilities Priority rules regarding responsibility conflicts for practitioners and philosophers of (techno)science 


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Karlsruher Institut für TechnologieInstitut für PhilosophieKarlsruheGermany

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