, Volume 28, Issue 6, pp 603–618 | Cite as

Roles for Values in Scientific Activities

  • Hugh LaceyEmail author
Original Paper


My aim in this paper is to rebut objections that have been made of the account of the various roles for values in scientific activities that I have developed, initially in my book Is Science Value Free?, in response to criticizing the proposal that science is value free. Specifically I respond to objections that my account does not recognize the significance of basic science, and that my defense of the ideal of impartiality cannot be sustained.


Values Science Science as value free Impartiality Neutrality 


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Swarthmore CollegeSwarthmoreUSA
  2. 2.University of São PauloSão PauloBrazil

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