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Axiomathes

, Volume 29, Issue 1, pp 5–16 | Cite as

Does a Philosophical Probe into Our Experience of Temporal Passage Determine Its Status?

  • Maitreyee DattaEmail author
Original Paper
  • 41 Downloads

Abstract

The age old conflict between logical analysis and phenomenological study revealed by different philosophical treatments of our experience of temporal passage are discussed in the present paper. Temporal passage is found to be problematic because philosophers entertain conflicting views regarding the status of the passage of time. As logical analyses prove temporal passage as unreal or illusory and phenomenological study of our experience of temporal passage considers it to be a fundamental structure of our life, the conflict regarding the status of the passage of time emerges. In this paper our aim will be to explore gradually different logical analyses of our experience of temporal passage provided by philosophers of both classical India and the West on the one hand and also to discuss some of the phenomenological treatments of our experience of temporal passage provided by some continental philosophers to show the conflict between the results of these two philosophical treatments. Finally, we would like to state that since this conflict culminates into the conflict between reason and experience, it is not possible to resolve the conflict in the present life form in which both these categories have their distinctive roles to play.

Keywords

Temporal passage Experience A-series B-series Classical Indian philosophy Phenomenon Illusory Human existence Inner life Anticipation Retention-now-protention 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyJadavpur UniversityKolkataIndia

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