Crossing the Line: New Intuitions Behind Frankfurt-Type Cases
Frankfurt-type cases with covered manipulation received a great attention in the debates about freedom of will and moral responsibility. They pretend to give the refutation of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) and to show that we can intuitively blame or praise an agent who was not able to do otherwise. In this paper, I will try to make explicit some basic intuitions underlying the agent’s responsibility in Frankfurt-type cases, which were surprisingly ignored in the contemporary debates. The key intuition is that the responsibility of the agent in Frankfurt-type cases is always grounded at the point of overcoming the uncertainty preceding action. This overcoming is crucially important for agent’s responsibility and immune to any manipulation of counterfactual intervener.
KeywordsFrankfurt cases Responsibility Compatibilism Alternative possibilities Freedom
The article was prepared within the framework of the Academic Fund Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) in 2015–2016 (grant №15-05-0005) and by the Russian Academic Excellence Project «5–100».
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