Advertisement

Axiomathes

, Volume 27, Issue 4, pp 393–402 | Cite as

Crossing the Line: New Intuitions Behind Frankfurt-Type Cases

  • Aleksandr MishuraEmail author
Original Paper

Abstract

Frankfurt-type cases with covered manipulation received a great attention in the debates about freedom of will and moral responsibility. They pretend to give the refutation of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) and to show that we can intuitively blame or praise an agent who was not able to do otherwise. In this paper, I will try to make explicit some basic intuitions underlying the agent’s responsibility in Frankfurt-type cases, which were surprisingly ignored in the contemporary debates. The key intuition is that the responsibility of the agent in Frankfurt-type cases is always grounded at the point of overcoming the uncertainty preceding action. This overcoming is crucially important for agent’s responsibility and immune to any manipulation of counterfactual intervener.

Keywords

Frankfurt cases Responsibility Compatibilism Alternative possibilities Freedom 

Notes

Acknowledgements

The article was prepared within the framework of the Academic Fund Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) in 2015–2016 (grant №15-05-0005) and by the Russian Academic Excellence Project «5–100».

References

  1. Berofsky B (2011) Compatibilism without Frankfurt: dispositional analyses of free will. In: Kane R (ed) Handbook of free will, 2nd edn. Oxford University Press, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  2. Fischer JM (1994) The metaphysics of free will: an essay on control. Blackwell, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  3. Fischer JM (2003) Responsibility and alternative possibilities. In: Widerker D, McKenna M (eds) Moral responsibility and alternative possibilities. Ashgate, BurlingtonGoogle Scholar
  4. Fischer JM (2006) The free will revolution. J Ethics 10(3):315–345 (Devoted to John Martin Fischer (Aug 2006)) CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Fischer JM (2010) The Frankfurt cases: the moral of the stories. Philos Rev 119:315–336CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Fischer JM (2012) Deep control. Oxford University Press, New YorkCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Frankfurt H (1969) Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. J Philos 66:829–839CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Haji I (2011) Obligation, reason, and Frankfurt examples. In: Kane R (ed) Oxford handbook of free will, 2nd edn. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 288–305Google Scholar
  9. Hobbs J (2012) Ought claims and blame in a deterministic world. Dissertation, Cornell University (forthcoming)Google Scholar
  10. Kane R (1996) The significance of free will. Oxford University Press, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  11. Lewis D (1981) Are we free to break the laws? Theoria 47(3):113–121CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. McKenna M (2005) Where Strawson and Frankfurt meet. Midwest Stud Philos 29:163–180CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Mele A, Robb D 1998 Rescuing Frankfurt-style cases. Philos Rev 107:97–112CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Moore GE (1912) Free will. In Moore ethics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 84–95Google Scholar
  15. Nelkin D (2011) Making sense of freedom and responsibility. Oxford University, OxfordCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Otsuka M 1998 Incompatibilism and the avoidability of blame. Ethics 108:685–701CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Pereboom D (2014) Free will, agency, and meaning in life. Oxford University Press, New York, p 2014CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Rowe W (2000) The metaphysics of freedom: Reid’s theory of agent causation. Am Cathol Philos Q 74:425–446CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Rowe W (2006) Free will, moral responsibility, and the problem of “Oomph”. J Ethics 10(3):295–313 (Devoted to John Martin Fischer (Aug 2006)) CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Van Inwagen P (1983) An essay on free will. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  21. Widerker D (2000) Frankfurt’s attack on the principle of alternative possibilities: a further look. Philos Perspect 14:181–201Google Scholar
  22. Widerker D, Goetz S (2013) Fischer against the dilemma defence: the defence prevails. Analysis 73(2):283–295CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Widerker D, McKenna M (eds) (2003) Moral responsibility and alternative possibilities. Ashgate, AldershotGoogle Scholar
  24. Wyma K 1997 Moral responsibility and the leeway for action. Am Philos Q 34:57–70Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.National Research University Higher School of EconomicsMoscowRussian Federation

Personalised recommendations