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Axiomathes

, Volume 27, Issue 1, pp 79–112 | Cite as

What is the Nature of Mathematical–Logical Objects?

  • Stathis LivadasEmail author
Original Paper

Abstract

This article deals with a question of a most general, comprehensive and profound content as it is the nature of mathematical–logical objects insofar as these are considered objects of knowledge and more specifically objects of formal mathematical theories. As objects of formal theories they are dealt with in the sense they have acquired primarily from the beginnings of the systematic study of mathematical foundations in connection with logic dating from the works of G. Cantor and G. Frege in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Largely motivated by a phenomenologically founded view of mathematical objects/states-of-affairs, I try to consistently argue for their character as objects shaped to a certain extent by intentional forms exhibited by consciousness and the modes of constitution of inner temporality and at the same time as constrained in the form of immanent ‘appearances’ by what stands as their non-eliminable reference, that is, the world as primitive soil of experience and the mathematical intuitions developed in relations of reciprocity within-the-world. In this perspective and relative to my intentions I enter, in the last section, into a brief review of certain positions of G. Sher’s foundational holism and R. Tieszen’s constituted platonism, among others, respectively presented in Sher (Bull Symb Log 19:145–198, 2013) and Tieszen (After Gödel: platonism and rationalism in mathematics and logic, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011).

Keywords

A priori possibility Infinite totality Intentional consciousness Objectivity of understanding Predicative activity Set constitution Temporal unity 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.PatrasGreece

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