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Axiomathes

, Volume 26, Issue 2, pp 205–218 | Cite as

Why be an Intellectually Humble Philosopher?

  • Moti Mizrahi
Original Paper

Abstract

In this paper, I sketch an answer to the question “Why be an intellectually humble philosopher?” I argue that, as far as philosophical argumentation is concerned, the historical record of Western Philosophy provides a straightforward answer to this question. That is, the historical record of philosophical argumentation, which is a track record that is marked by an abundance of alternative theories and serious problems for those theories, can teach us important lessons about the limits of philosophical argumentation. These lessons, in turn, show why philosophers should argue with humility.

Keywords

Intellectual humility Metaphilosophy Philosophical argumentation Virtue argumentation theory Virtue epistemology 

Notes

Acknowledgments

A version of this paper was presented at the Third Annual Philosophers’ Cocoon conference, November 2015, University of Tampa. Thanks to Marcus Arvan for his commentary and the audience for the questions. I am also grateful to Andrew Aberdein and an anonymous reviewer of Axiomathes for helpful comments on an earlier draft.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Arts and CommunicationFlorida Institute of TechnologyMelbourneUSA

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