, Volume 23, Issue 3, pp 543–550 | Cite as

Ontology, Reference, and the Qua Problem: Amie Thomasson on Existence

Original Paper


I argue that Amie Thomasson’s recent theory of the methodology to be applied to find the truth-conditions for claims of existence faces serious objections. Her account is based on Devitt and Sterelny’s solution to the qua problem for theories of reference fixing; however, such a solution cannot be also applied to analyze existential claims.


Ontology Existence Reference Amie Thomasson Metaphysics 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyHankuk University of Foreign StudiesYonginRepublic of Korea

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