Ontology, Reference, and the Qua Problem: Amie Thomasson on Existence
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I argue that Amie Thomasson’s recent theory of the methodology to be applied to find the truth-conditions for claims of existence faces serious objections. Her account is based on Devitt and Sterelny’s solution to the qua problem for theories of reference fixing; however, such a solution cannot be also applied to analyze existential claims.
KeywordsOntology Existence Reference Amie Thomasson Metaphysics
This work was supported by Hankuk University of Foreign Studies Research Fund of 2011. Many thanks to Paisley Livingston and Amie Thomasson for comments on previous versions of this paper.
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