Axiomathes

, Volume 23, Issue 3, pp 543–550 | Cite as

Ontology, Reference, and the Qua Problem: Amie Thomasson on Existence

Original Paper
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Abstract

I argue that Amie Thomasson’s recent theory of the methodology to be applied to find the truth-conditions for claims of existence faces serious objections. Her account is based on Devitt and Sterelny’s solution to the qua problem for theories of reference fixing; however, such a solution cannot be also applied to analyze existential claims.

Keywords

Ontology Existence Reference Amie Thomasson Metaphysics 

Notes

Acknowledgments

This work was supported by Hankuk University of Foreign Studies Research Fund of 2011. Many thanks to Paisley Livingston and Amie Thomasson for comments on previous versions of this paper.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyHankuk University of Foreign StudiesYonginRepublic of Korea

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