, Volume 23, Issue 2, pp 343–364 | Cite as

How Does an Aristotelian Substance Have its Platonic Properties? Issues and Options

  • Paul GouldEmail author
Invited Paper


Attempts to explicate the substance-property nexus are legion in the philosophical literature both historical and contemporary. In this paper, I shall attempt to impose some structure into the discussion by exploring ways to combine two unlikely bedfellows—Platonic properties and Aristotelian substances. Special attention is paid to the logical structure of substances and the metaphysics of property exemplification. I shall argue that an Aristotelian-Platonic account of the substance-property nexus is possible and has been ably defended by contemporary philosophers.


Aristotelianism Bare particular Constituent ontology Exemplification Loux Moreland Property Platonism Relational ontology Substance 



I am grateful to J.P. Moreland and Javier Cumpa for many insightful comments on an earlier version of this paper.


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty CommonsDurhamUSA

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