Axiomathes

, Volume 20, Issue 4, pp 479–493 | Cite as

Anti-Positionalism’s Regress

Original paper
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Abstract

This paper is about the Problem of Order, which is basically the problem how to account for both the distinctness of facts like a’s preceding b and b’s preceding a, and the identity of facts like a’s preceding b and b’s succeeding a. It has been shown that the Standard View fails to account for the second part and is therefore to be replaced. One of the contenders is Anti-Positionalism. As has recently been pointed out, however, Anti-Positionalism falls prey to a regress argument which is to prove its failure. In the paper we spell out this worry, show that the worry is a serious one, and distinguish four possible strategies for Anti-Positionalism to deal with it.

Keywords

Relation Order Fact Anti-Positionalism Infinite regress 

Notes

Acknowledgements

Many thanks to Joop Leo for explaining Anti-Positionalism to me (see Leo 2008), to two anonymous referees and my MA examiners Dennis Schulting, Arianna Betti and Paul Dekker for helpful feedback, and to Fraser MacBride for attracting my attention to Russell’s text cited in §6. The author is PhD fellow of the Research Foundation Flanders at Ghent University.

References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centre for Logic and Philosophy of ScienceGhent UniversityGhentBelgium

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