Atomic Energy

, Volume 126, Issue 5, pp 332–338 | Cite as

State and Role of Level-5 of NPP Protection-in-Depth System

  • V. A. PanteleevEmail author
  • M. D. Segal’

The topical problem of increasing scientific and technical support for level 5, associated with emergency planning and response, of the protection-in-depth system of NPP is examined. As severe accidents have shown, the greatest socioeconomic harm is associated with the excessive response by decision makers. There is a need to increase scientific-technical and methodological support for level 5 of the protection-in-depth system. It is shown that the use of risk-based approaches and the methodology of level-3 probabilistic safety analysis will make it possible to avoid scaling-up the socioeconomic consequences of radiation accidents and to optimize the available forces and means for mitigating the consequences of accidents.


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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Nuclear Safety InstituteRussian Academy of Sciences (IBRAE RAS)MoscowRussia

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