Artificial Intelligence and Law

, Volume 19, Issue 1, pp 23–48

A model of juridical acts: part 1: the world of law

Article

Abstract

This paper aims at providing an account of juridical acts that forms a suitable starting point for the creation of computational systems that deal with juridical acts. The paper is divided into two parts. Because juridical acts will be analyzed as intentional changes in the world of law, the ‘furniture’ of this world, that consists broadly speaking of entities, facts and rules, plays a central role in the analysis. This first part of the paper deals with this furniture and its philosophical underpinnings, and at the same time introduces most of the logical apparatus that will be used to deal with it. The focus in the first part is on static and dynamic legal rules and their interplay in constituting the world of law.

Keywords

Juridical acts Dynamic legal rules Static legal rules Counts as rules Doctrinal concepts Internal legal concepts 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Universities of Maastricht and HasseltMaastrichtNetherlands

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