Artificial Intelligence and Law

, Volume 18, Issue 2, pp 175–215 | Cite as

Doing justice to rights and values: teleological reasoning and proportionality



This paper studies how legal choices, and in particular legislative determinations, need to consider multiple rights and values, and can be assessed accordingly. First it is argued that legal norms (and in particular constitutional right-norms) often prescribe the pursuit of goals, which may be in conflict one with another. Then a model of teleological reasoning is brought to bear on choices affecting different goals, among which those prescribed by constitutional norms. An analytical framework is provided for evaluating such choices with regard to possible alternatives. The assessment of legislative choices according to proportionality is then considered, and is modelled using the provided analytical framework. Finally, the framework is expanded to include the ideas of reasonableness and institutional deference, and the corresponding margins of appreciation.


Argumentation Proportionality Teleological reasoning Values Norms Constitutional review 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Law Department Villa SchifanoiaEuropean University InstituteFlorenceItaly
  2. 2.CIRSFICBolognaItaly

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