Advertisement

Artificial Intelligence and Law

, Volume 15, Issue 4, pp 429–447 | Cite as

Formal models of coherence and legal epistemology

  • Amalia AmayaEmail author
Original Paper

Abstract

This paper argues that formal models of coherence are useful for constructing a legal epistemology. Two main formal approaches to coherence are examined: coherence-based models of belief revision and the theory of coherence as constraint satisfaction. It is shown that these approaches shed light on central aspects of a coherentist legal epistemology, such as the concept of coherence, the dynamics of coherentist justification in law, and the mechanisms whereby coherence may be built in the course of legal decision-making.

Keywords

Legal epistemology Coherence Belief revision Constraint satisfaction 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Jorge Cerdio, Rossella Rubino, and Frederick Schauer for comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I thank an anonymous reviewer for his comments.

References

  1. Alchourrón CE, Gärdenfors P, Makinson D (1985) On the logic of theory change: partial meet contraction and revision functions. J Symbol Logic 50:510–530zbMATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Amaya A (2006) An inquiry into the nature of coherence and its role in legal argument, PhD thesis, European University InstituteGoogle Scholar
  3. Balterborth T (1999) Coherence and explanations. Erkenntnis 50:209–224CrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  4. Bench-Capon T, Sartor G (2001) Theory-based explanation of case law domains. In: Proceedings of the eighth international conference on AI and Law, 12–21 St Louis, MO ACM Press, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  5. Bench-Capon T, Sartor G (2003) A model of legal reasoning with cases incorporating theories and values. Artif Intel Law 150:97–113zbMATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Bender J (1989) Coherence, justification, and knowledge: the current debate. In: Bender J (ed) The current state of the coherence theory: critical essays on the epistemic theories of Keith Lehrer and Lawrence BonJour, with replies, Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp 1–14Google Scholar
  7. BonJour L (1989) Replies and clarifications. In: Bender J (ed) The current state of the coherence theory, Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp 276–292Google Scholar
  8. BonJour L (1999) The dialectic of foundationalism and coherentism. In: Greco J, Sosa E (eds) The Blackwell guide to epistemology, Blackwell, Oxford, pp 117–142Google Scholar
  9. Conte ME (1999) Condizioni di Coerenza: Ricerche di Linguistica Testuale. Edizioni dell’Orso, FirenzeGoogle Scholar
  10. Doyle J (1992) Reason maintenance and belief revision: foundations vs coherence theories. In: Gärdenfors P (ed) Belief revision, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 29–51Google Scholar
  11. Furhmann A (1997) An essay on contraction. CSLI Publications, StanfordGoogle Scholar
  12. Gärdenfors P (1988) Knowledge in flux: modeling the dynamics of epistemic states. MIT Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  13. Gärdenfors P (1990) The dynamics of belief systems: foundations vs. coherence theories. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 172:24–46Google Scholar
  14. Gärdenfors P (1992) Belief revision: an introduction. In: Gärdenfors P (ed) Belief revision. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 1–27Google Scholar
  15. Gärdenfors P (2005) The dynamics of thought. Springer, DordrechtGoogle Scholar
  16. Gärdenfors P, Rott H (1995) Belief revision. In: Gabbay DM, Hogger CJ, Robinson JA (eds) Handbook of logic in artificial intelligence and logic programming, vol 4, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 35–132Google Scholar
  17. Hansson SO (1994) Taking belief bases seriously. In: Prawitz D, Westertøahl D (eds) Logic and philosophy of science in Uppsala. Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp 13–28Google Scholar
  18. Hansson SO (1997a) Semi-revision. J Appl Non-Classical Logic 7:151–175zbMATHMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  19. Hansson SO (1997b) What’s new isn’t always best. Theoria 63:1–13MathSciNetCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Hansson SO (1999a) A textbook of belief dynamics. Kluwer, DordrechtzbMATHGoogle Scholar
  21. Hansson SO (1999b) A survey of non-prioritized belief revision. Erkenntnis 51:413–427CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Hansson SO (2003) Ten philosophical problems in belief revision. J Logic Comput 13:37–49zbMATHCrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  23. Hansson SO, Wassermann R (2002) Local change. Studia Logica 70:49–76zbMATHCrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  24. Hansson SO (2004) Belief revision from an epistemological point of view. In: Niiniluoto I, Sintonen M, Wolénski J (eds) Handbook of epistemology. Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp 255–279Google Scholar
  25. Hansson SO, Olsson EJ (1999) Providing foundations for coherentism. Erkenntnis 51:243–265CrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  26. Harman G (1995) Rationality. In: Smith EE, Osherson DN (eds) An invitation to cognitive science, vol 3. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 175–212Google Scholar
  27. Klein P, Warfield TA (1994) What price coherence? Analysis 54:129–132CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Mares ED (2002) A paraconsistent theory of belief revision. Erkenntnis 56:229–246zbMATHCrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  29. Martin E, Osherson D (1997) Scientific discovery based on belief revision. J Symbol Logic 62:1352–1370zbMATHCrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  30. Martin E, Osherson D (1998) Elements of scientific inquiry. MIT Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  31. Martin E, Osherson D (2002) Scientific discovery from the perspective of hypothesis acceptance. Philos Sci 69:S331–S341CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. Nozick R (1993) The nature of rationality. Princeton University Press, PrincetonGoogle Scholar
  33. Olsson EJ (1997a) Coherence: studies in epistemology and belief revision, PhD thesis, Uppsala UniversityGoogle Scholar
  34. Olsson EJ (1997b) A coherence interpretation of semi-revision. Theoria 63:105–134MathSciNetCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  35. Olsson EJ (1998) Making beliefs coherent. J Logic Lang Inform 7:143–163zbMATHCrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  36. Olsson EJ (1999) Cohering with. Erkenntnis 50:273–291zbMATHCrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  37. Pollock JL, Gillies AS (2000) Belief revision and epistemology. Synthese 122:69–92zbMATHCrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  38. Priest G (2001) Paraconsistent belief revision. Theoria 67:214–228MathSciNetCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  39. Putnam H (1981) Reason, truth and history. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  40. Rott H (2001) Change, choice and inference: a study of belief revision and nonmonotonic reasoning. Oxford University Press, OxfordzbMATHGoogle Scholar
  41. Shaffer MJ (2002) Coherence, justification, and the AGM theory of belief revision. In: Bouchard Y (ed) Perspectives on coherentism. Scribe, Aylmer, pp 139–160Google Scholar
  42. Simon D (2004) A third view of the black box: cognitive coherence in legal decision-making. Univ Chicago Law Rev 65:511–586Google Scholar
  43. Sintonen M, Kiikeri M (2004) Scientific discovery. In: Niiniluoto, I, Sintonen, M, Wolénski, J (eds) Handbook of epistemology, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, pp 205–253Google Scholar
  44. Tanaka K (2005) The AGM theory and inconsistent belief change. Logique et Analyse 48:113–151zbMATHMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  45. Thagard P (1989) Explanatory coherence. Behav Brain Sci 12:435–467CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  46. Thagard P (1992) Conceptual revolutions. Princeton University Press, PrincetonGoogle Scholar
  47. Thagard P (2000) Coherence in thought and action. MIT Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  48. Thagard P (2003) Why wasn’t OJ convicted? Emotional coherence in legal inference. Cogn Emot 17:361–383CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  49. Thagard P (2004a) Causal inference in legal decision making: explanatory coherence vs Bayesian networks. Appl Artif Intel 18:231–249CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  50. Thagard P (2004b) What is doubt and when is it reasonable? In: Ezcurdia M, Stainton R, Viger C (eds) New essays in the philosophy of language and mind. Can J Philos 30:391S–406SGoogle Scholar
  51. Thagard P (2005) Testimony, credibility, and explanatory coherence. Erkentnnis 63:295–316zbMATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  52. Thagard P (2006a) Evaluating explanations in law, science, and everyday life. Curr Direct Psychol Sci 15:141–145CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  53. Thagard P (2006b) Hot thought: mechanisms and applications of emotional cognition. MIT Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  54. Thagard P, Verbeurgt K (1998) Coherence as constraint satisfaction cognitive. Science 22:1–24Google Scholar
  55. Wassermann R (1999) Resource bounded belief revision. Erkenntnis 50:429–446zbMATHCrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  56. Wassermann R (2001) On structured belief bases. In: Williams MA, Rott H (eds) Frontiers in belief revision. Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp 349–367Google Scholar
  57. Wassermann R (2003) Generalized change and the meaning of rationality postulates. Studia Logica 73:200–319CrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  58. Williams M (1996) Unnatural doubts: epistemological realism and the basis of skepticism. Princenton University Press, PrincetonGoogle Scholar
  59. Wintgens L (2007, forthcoming) Making sense of coherence: the level theory of coherence. Artif Intel LawGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Harvard Law SchoolHarvard UniversityCambridgeUSA

Personalised recommendations