Abstract
What do we learn when we find out that an argument is logically incorrect? If logically incorrect means the same as not logically correct, which in turn means not having a valid logical form, it seems that we do not learn anything too useful—an argument which is logically incorrect can still be conclusive. Thus, it seems that it makes sense to fix a stronger interpretation of the term under which a logically incorrect argument is guaranteed to be wrong (and is such for purely logical reasons). In this paper, we show that pinpointing this stronger sense is much trickier than one would expect; but eventually we reach an explication of the notion of (strong) logical incorrectness which we find non-trivial and viable.
Keywords
Argumentation Logical form Incorrect argument Correct argumentsNotes
Acknowledgments
Work on this paper was supported by the research Grant No. 13-21076S of the Czech Science Foundation. We are grateful to Georg Brun, Hans Rott, Vít Punčochář, Marta Vlasáková and anonymous reviewers of Argumentation for valuable critical comments.
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