Argumentation

, Volume 26, Issue 2, pp 201–212

“People Who Argue Ad Hominem Are Jerks” and Other Self-Fulfilling Fallacies

Article

Abstract

A self-fulfilling fallacy (SFF) is a fallacious argument whose conclusion is that the very fallacy employed is an invalid or otherwise illegitimate inferential procedure. This paper discusses three different ways in which SFF’s might serve to justify their conclusions. SFF’s might have probative value as honest and straightforward arguments, they might serve to justify the premise of a meta-argument or, following a point made by Roy Sorensen, they might provide a non-inferential basis for accepting their conclusion. The paper concludes with an assessment of the relative merits of these proposals.

Keywords

Fallacies Epistemology Self-reference Immodesty Self-effacement Self-reference Sorensen Saccheri 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyEast Carolina UniversityGreenvilleUSA

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