Argumentation

, Volume 25, Issue 2, pp 163–170

The Kisceral: Reason and Intuition in Argumentation

Article
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Abstract

Gilbert’s four modes of communication include the logical, the emotional, the visceral and the kisceral, which last has not received much attention at all. This mode covers the forms of argument that rely on intuition and undefended basal assumptions. These forms range from the scientific and mathematical to the religious and mystical. In this paper these forms will be examined, and suggestions made for ways in which intuitive frameworks can be compared and valued.

Keywords

Kisceral Intuition Multi-modal argument Conceptual frameworks 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.York UniversityTorontoCanada

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