, Volume 22, Issue 2, pp 191–203 | Cite as

Rationality, Reasonableness, and Critical Rationalism: Problems with the Pragma-dialectical View



A major virtue of the Pragma-Dialectical theory of argumentation is its commitment to reasonableness and rationality as central criteria of argumentative quality. However, the account of these key notions offered by the originators of this theory, Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, seems to us problematic in several respects. In what follows we criticize that account and suggest an alternative, offered elsewhere, that seems to us to be both independently preferable and more in keeping with the epistemic approach to arguments and argumentation we favor.


Critical rationalism  Münchhausen Trilemma  Pragma-dialectic Rationality  Reasonableness Justification 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of MiamiCoral GablesUSA
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of FloridaGainesvilleUSA

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