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Argumentation

, Volume 21, Issue 1, pp 39–61 | Cite as

The Burden of Proof and Its Role in Argumentation

  • Ulrike Hahn
  • Mike Oaksford
Article

Abstract

The notion of “the burden of proof” plays an important role in real-world argumentation contexts, in particular in law. It has also been given a central role in normative accounts of argumentation, and has been used to explain a range of classic argumentation fallacies. We argue that in law the goal is to make practical decisions whereas in critical discussion the goal is frequently simply to increase or decrease degree of belief in a proposition. In the latter case, it is not necessarily important whether that degree of belief exceeds a particular threshold (e.g., ‘reasonable doubt’). We explore the consequences of this distinction for the role that the “burden of proof” has played in argumentation and in theories of fallacy.

Keywords

argumentation argument from ignorance argument strength burden of proof decision-theory fallacies standard of proof 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PsychologyCardiff UniversityCardiffUK
  2. 2.School of Psychology Birkbeck College LondonLondonUK

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