Asia Pacific Journal of Management

, Volume 30, Issue 4, pp 965–986 | Cite as

Corporate governance and national institutions: A review and emerging research agenda

  • Igor Filatotchev
  • Gregory Jackson
  • Chizu Nakajima
Perspectives

Abstract

We present a critique of corporate governance research grounded in agency theory and propose that cross-national comparison of corporate governance should consider how the nature and extent of agency relationships differ across different institutional contexts. Building on prior governance studies grounded in sociology and organizational theory we argue that performance outcomes of boards of directors, ownership concentration, and executive incentives may differ depending on the legal system and institutional characteristics in a specific country. Institutions may also affect the extent of complimentarity/substitution among different firm-level governance practices producing patterned variations in firm-level governance mechanisms. Our discussion suggests that researchers need to develop more holistic, institutionally embedded governance framework to analyze organizational outcomes of various governance practices.

Keywords

Corporate governance Agency Institutions 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Igor Filatotchev
    • 1
    • 2
  • Gregory Jackson
    • 3
  • Chizu Nakajima
    • 1
  1. 1.Sir John Cass Business School, City University LondonLondonUK
  2. 2.Department of Global Business and TradeVienna University of Economics and BusinessViennaAustria
  3. 3.Freie Universität Berlin, School of Business and EconomicsBerlinGermany

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