Asia Pacific Journal of Management

, Volume 27, Issue 4, pp 775–802

Executive compensation in Asia: A critical review and outlook

Article

Abstract

In this research we conduct a systematic and critical review of the literature on executive compensation in Asian countries. We discuss the particular characteristics of executive compensation in Asia in terms of pay criteria, contingency factors, and implications for performance and turnover. We thereby highlight the unique contributions of Asian studies to the mainstream Western research in executive compensation, and call for future research integrating agency theory and the institution-based view in examining pay variances across different institutions.

Keyword

Executive compensation Asia Review Agency theory Institution-based view 

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute for Entrepreneurship and Innovation, Bloch School of Business and AdministrationUniversity of Missouri—Kansas CityKansas CityUSA
  2. 2.Department of Management and MarketingCalifornia State University, Dominguez Hills,CarsonUSA
  3. 3.Department of ManagementCity University of Hong KongKowloonHong Kong

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