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Necessary players, Myerson fairness and the equal treatment of equals

  • Florian NavarroEmail author
Original Research

Abstract

This article addresses linear sharing rules on transferable utility games (TU-games) with various structures, namely communication structures and conference structures as defined by Myerson in two papers (Myerson in Mathematics of Operations Research 2:225–229, 1977; Myerson in International Journal of Game Theory 9:169–182, 1980). Here, using matrix expressions, we rewrite those sharing rules. With this presentation we identify the close relationship between the fairness property and an equal treatment of necessary players axiom. Moreover, we show that the latter is implied by the equal treatment of equals, linking the fairness property to the notion of equality.

Keywords

Game theory Myerson value Fairness Graph Cooperative games 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Laboratoire LEM UMR 9221Université de Lille, Maison de la Recherche Domaine universitaire du Pont de BoisVilleneuve d’Ascq CedexFrance

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